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FEATURE
ARTICLES
Consumerism in Japan:
Rising Star or Setting Sun?
by Thomas Flannigan
and Amanda Andrews
Dazai Osamu,' founder of the
Japanese taiyouzoku ( "Sun-Tribe")
school of literature, is a household
name in Japan. While Japan rose from
the devastation wrought by World War
II and began rebuilding a prosperous
society, Dazai and his followers
scorned Japan's new-found affluence
and urged a return to traditional
Japanese values of thrift and hard
work.2 The Japanese people have since
rallied around both Dazai's teachings
and his suicide, his ultimate protest
against Japan's westernization and
rapidly rising materialism. This idea of
self-sacrifice is still the central theme of
the Sun-Tribe, as Danzai's followers
call themselves. Today, Ishihara
Shintaro, Japan's most popular
politician and a loyal follower of the
Sun-Tribe, continues to preach restraint
and frugality in sharp contrast to the
prevailing ethic in other advanced
industrial countries.3
While much of the world has
promoted credit and free access to
consumer products, Japan has clearly
marched to the beat of a different
drummer. Japan has not experienced
the powerful force of the consumer
movements that has shaped public
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policy in most of Japan's trading
partners. Japan continues to maintain
a powerful web of formal and informal
restrictions on consumer behavior that
has no exact parallel in any member of
the OECD.4
Defying the Laws of Gravity
First-time visitors to Japan are
usually impressed by the bustling,
cosmopolitan nature of public
commerce. Stores, some large, some
small, seem to be everywhere, and are
open long hours. Advertising is
everywhere. Foreign trademarks, or at
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least those that appear to be foreign,
are visible all over business districts
and shotengai, the lively shopping
streets that adorn nearly every
Japanese neighborhood and town.
Shops are usually clean and goods are
beautifully presented. The drab,
smelly bazaars of the communist world
seem light years away. Japan appears
to be something of a consumer's
paradise.
To the contrary, the image does not
meet the reality. Shoppers who spend
time investigating almost any industry
will find that some rules of capitalism
that supposedly govern human
behavior seem to have been caught in a
state of suspended animation in Japan.
Japan has the highest production costs
for cement and concrete in the world,
yet is a net exporter of both items. The
low cost producer of both products,
Korea, has a negligible market
presence in Japan, although Korean
cement and concrete sell well
throughout the world.
Beer is another puzzlement.
Sapporo Beer, brewed in Tokyo, sells
for 3 Hong Kong dollars (U.S. $.40) per
can at the Pic N' Pack chain in Hong
Kong, and .80 cents per can all over the
U.S. In Tokyo, nearly every store and
vending machine sells the identical can
of beer for 230 yen (U.S. $1.80). An
open capitalist system would quickly
import Korean cement and Dutch beer
until the local Japanese producers were
either driven out of business or made
to become more efficient. In Japan, an
invisible hand, one quite different than
the invisible hand envisioned by Adam
Smith, 6 seems to keep high cost
domestic producers flourishing, and
consumers paying far too much for too
little.
Japan has become famous for its
high prices. The media has spread
stories of Tokyo stores selling 50 dollar
melons and 8 dollar apples. This is due
to Japan's heavily protected and
terribly inefficient agricultural sector
which leads to high prices for basic
products such as melons and rice.
What is less obvious is how expensive
consumer products manufactured in
Japan are in Japan. In 1992, one of the
authors was in Manaus, Brazil, in the
heart of the Amazon jungle, and met a
group of Japanese tourists laden with
Panasonic VCRs and Sony stereo
equipment. All of this equipment was
manufactured close to their homes in
Japan, yet they were able to buy such
equipment in Brazil at half the price
charged in Japan.
Elsewhere in the world, goods are
generally cheaper when purchased
near their point of production. In
Japan, this supposedly universal rule
of economics has been discarded. Japan
is the most expensive place in the
world to buy many Japanese products.
Taggart Murphy, former partner of
Goldman Sachs who has resided in
Japan for many years, provides
anecdotal evidence of these high
consumer prices:
"Eight brussel sprouts cost 280
yen (U.S. $3.29) or better than 41
cents per sprout at my local store.
Four grapefruit-type citrus called
hassaku run for 480 yen (U.S.
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$5.65), a liter of milk for 188 yen
(U.S. $2.21), a head of lettuce for
260 yen (U.S. $3.06) and two small
cod fillets 600 yen (U.S. $7.06). I
pay 3,300 yen in tolls to go some
sixty miles on the expressway...
Last summer, I tried my hand at
gardening. A bag of fertilizer that
in the states would go for $4 costs
3000 yen (U.S. $35.29). ',
Explanations for this phenomenon
are specious at best. Some point to the
"inefficient" distribution system.8 This
does not provide a plausible explanation.
If the Japanese distribution system was
at the root of the problem, retail prices
of Japanese goods sold abroad would
also be high, because at least some of
the high transaction costs would be
added to the product before it left
Japanese shores. In fact, the opposite is
true. Japanese auto parts, cosmetics,
beer, film and a host of other products
sell for lower prices abroad than in
Japan. Classical western economics,
and western consumer movements,
offer little help in explaining this
phenomenon. While appearing
western and consumer-friendly, Japan
has actually bent Adam Smith's
invisible hand to favor producers and
national goals, rather than the interests
of consumers. The end result involves
a system that defies the laws of gravity
as calibrated by western economists.
The end result also mandates that the
Japanese consumer often subsidizes
exports by paying high domestic prices
for Japanese goods. Whether the
Japanese consumer ultimately benefits
should be carefully considered. But
first, the the origins of the current
Japanese system must be considered.
Early Contact with the West
Japanese civilization evolved under
the influence of China, in isolation
from European civilization. Europeans
first came into regular contact with
Japan in the 16th century. By this time,
Japan had already become a highly
developed nation. Accurate
comparisons are difficult, but some
historians believe Japan had the 3 rd or
4 th highest GNP of any nation in the
world by 1600. The literacy rate and
development of its economy compared
favorably to all but a few European
nations.9
Japan severed almost all contact
with Europe in 1609, at the beginning
of the sakoku jidai, or period of
seclusion. Japan's only contact with
Europe was through a Dutch
concession on the man-made island of
Dejima (advanced island), in the harbor
of Nagasaki. The Dutch traders
isolated on Dejima were generally not
allowed ashore. Japanese who had any
contact with Europeans or other
westerners outside of Nagasaki were
either put to death forced to live a life
of exile due to the contact with
westerners. 0
Two hundred and fifty years of
seclusion ended when an American
flotilla, commanded by Commodore
Perry, reached Edo (Tokyo) in 1852,
demanding that Japan open to the
West. When Perry's kuroifune (black
ships) 1 returned the following year,
Japan's elite felt they had no choice but
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to accede to Perry's demands.
Diplomatic relations and trading posts
were established, and Japan began
trading with the West.
The terms of trade with the west,
including Japan's tariff rates, were set
by America and Europe. Japan was
forced to sign a series of humiliating
treaties which provided that western
nationals resident in Japan were not
subject to the laws and courts of
Japan. 2 The legacy of these "unequal
treaties" as well as chronic trade
deficits with North America and
Europe, enforced the earlier Japanese
reticence of trading with the west.
In spite of these misgivings, Japan
enjoyed a period of prosperity.
Between 1853 and 1923, Japan
modernized at a remarkable rate.
Japanese elites assimilated much of the
technology from America and Europe.
Japanese silk and light manufactures
were exported around the world, and
foreign products became increasingly
common on Japanese shelves. Mogos
(modern girls), and mobos (modern
boys), youths dressed in western
fashions sported by flappers in
America, roamed the streets. To
western observers, Japan appeared to
be evolving in the direction of a
western, consumer-driven economy.
Japan Changes Course
This period of prosperity and
relative openness to the west ended
abruptly on September 1, 1923, when a
magnitude 8.2 earthquake struck
Tokyo. The resulting fire and chaos
wiped out 40 per cent of Japan's GNP
and killed 144,000 people. During the
aftermath of this tragedy, known as the
Kanto Dai Shinsai (Great Kanto
Earthquake Disaster), Japan looked
inward and began to establish new
policies governing foreign trade.
Japanese were urged to buy Japanese
products and to conserve resources in
order to rebuild the nation.
This effort was spearheaded by the
Ministry of Munitions, a governmental
body now known as the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry
("MITI"), an agency without an exact
counterpart in the United States. In
1925, The Ministry of Munitions began
implementing policies that favored
producers, especially producers
attempting to crack foreign markets.
MITI encouraged the acquisition of
foreign technology and discouraged
the importation of foreign
manufactured goods. These policies of
economic nationalism paid off
handsomely; Japan recovered from the
devastation of the Kanto Dai Shinsai
and its economy boomed, even as
western economies were collapsing
during the Dai Fukyou (Great
Depression) of the 1930's.
Unfortunately, Japan also adopted
militaristic policies that culminated in
invasions of much of East Asia and
Southeast Asia, and its ultimate defeat
by the Allied forces in World War II.
Japan had many national slogans
during World War II, but one of the
most enduring was Hoshigarimasen
Katsu Made Wa (We won't ask for
anything until we have won). Japan,
which manufactured 8 tons of steel in
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1940 knew that it could only hope to
defeat the United States, which
produced 80 tons of steel the same
year, if it worked harder and made a
superior sacrifice. Japanese consumers
endured far stricter levels of rationing
and material hardship than consumers
in the U.S. or Europe, and this sacrifice
continued throughout the war. Even
this level of sacrifice was not enough.
Power in the Ministries
The Allied Occupation of Japan did
not break the power of the elite
ministries vested with enormous
power and discretion in regulating
nearly every aspect of the Japanese
economy. Various government
ministries, such as okurasho (Ministry of
Finance) and MITI recruit each year 20
to 30 of the brightest graduates of
Tokyo University, especially graduates
of the elite law faculty. These graduates
generally stay with the ministry for
most of the rest of their working life,
toiling long hours for modest salaries.
They generally are not corrupt and
make their decisions based on their
perceptions of the Japanese national
interest.
When each ministry elects a new
jimu jikan (vice minister), roughly every
two years, all bureaucrats older than
the new vice minister must resign and
are placed in prestigious, high-paying
jobs in the companies they were
formerly regulating. This process,
know as amakudari (descent from
heaven) assures a close relationship
between the ministries and the private
sector.
For the second time in 25 years,
Japan was faced with the necessity of
rebuilding its economy, and the
economic nationalism fostered by the
prewar Ministry of Munitions was
continued by MITI. These policies,
including protectionism, were fully
supported by the Allied Occupation
forces. Americans licensed or gave
away technology, encouraged Japanese
economic development, and opened its
market to Japanese manufactures.
American and Japanese experts
rewrote the Japanese tax code, hoping
to stimulate savings and investment
and discourage consumption. The
entire nation of Japan worked and
sacrificed as never before. America's
leading expert on Japan, Professor
Chalmers Johnson, noted
In 1945, amid the ruins of Osaka, a
group of businessmen lamented to
an American observer that the
militarists had 'started the war
twenty years too soon.' Although
the figure should probably be
more like forty years than twenty,
it is nonetheless true that from
about 1941 to 1961 the Japanese
economy remained on a war
footing. The goal changed from
military to economic victory, but
the Japanese people could not
have worked harder, saved more,
or innovated more ruthlessly if
they had actually been engaged in
a war for national survival, as in
fact they were. And just as a
nation mobilized for war needs a
military general staff, so a nation
mobilized for economic
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development needs an economic
general staff. The men of MCI,
MM and MITI had been preparing
to play this role since the late
1920's. During the 1950's, the
trumpet finally sounded.13
By the time of the Tokyo Olympics
in 1964, Japan had clearly rejoined the
ranks of advanced industrial nations,
and the rationale for continued
national sacrifice had become
outdated. To paraphrase the old
slogan, Japanese consumers could ask
for material things because they had
indeed won the battle to rebuild Japan.
However, Japan continued to promote
a doctrine of sacrifice towards national
goals of economic development. In the
1960s, MITI issued one of its periodic
"white papers" which predicted that
Japanese per capita income would
surpass per capita income in the
United States by 1988.4 At the time, it
seemed to be a hopelessly optimistic
prediction. Japan indeed surpassed the
U.S. in per capita GNP one year earlier
than predicted, in 1987. In the same
decade, Japan passed the U.S. in steel
production and automobile
production. By 1993, more than one-
half of all private savings in the world
were held by Japanese citizens or
companies. 15
Japanese consumers shared in this
spectacular economic advance, but not
to the extent that consumers in other
advanced nations had shared in the
national bounty. Japanese workers
continued to slave long hours, living in
cramped housing, and paying some of
the highest consumer prices in the
world. Compared to the consumers of
other nations, they continued to be a
cooperative and dedicated group of
people. They continued to sacrifice in
ways that the consumers of other
nations would only sacrifice in time of
war. When a consumer movement in
Japan finally surfaced in Japan, it
evolved in a direction radically
different from consumer movements in
North America and Europe.
Consumer Movement in Japan
Americans would generally
consider consumer groups to be
dedicated to the interests of consumers
in general or specific groups in
particular. Such organizations can be
expected to pressure governmental or
private entities for disclosure,
improved safety, or better prices. They
are usually at loggerheads with
government or industry, or both. Ralph
Nader has been criticized for many
foibles, real and imagined, but he is
generally not regarded as a tool of an
invisible power structure.
In contrast, consumer groups in
Japan usually find their initiatives to be
blunted or coopted to organize their
behavior to conform to national goals.
The Dutch journalist Karel Van
Wolferen noted,
Take, for instance the consumer
movement. Middle-class Japanese
housewives are a potentially
important political presence.
Finding themselves with
increasing leisure, they have
developed an enthusiasm for
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neighborhood causes, and hardly
a neighborhood today is without
its fujinkai, or women's group. The
Japanese housewives' association,
Shufuren, was one of the earliest
pressure groups, established in
1948 mainly to counter post-war
black marketeering. In the late
1960s and early 1970s it joined
Chifuren (an umbrella
organization of a multitude of
fujinkai) in spearheading
consumer campaigns that gave the
impression of a new kind of
political activism. But after some
minor successes, such as a
regulation making it mandatory
for manufacturers of canned fruit-
juice, and a lowering of prices on
color TV sets, its activism was
essentially blunted ... Even
though in the late 1980s the
number of consumer groups is
estimated at almost thirteen
thousand, and though Chifuren
claims a combined membership of
more than six million housewives,
their existence is hardly ever
noticed. This is remarkable, given
the wealth of justification for
agitation afforded by the excessive
mark-up for most items
(particularly food).'6
Japanese consumer prices are the
subject of a certain degree of awe
throughout the world. Tokyo
periodically tops the list of the world's
most expensive cities. Visitors are
regaled with horror stories of two
hundred dollar cab rides and thousand
dollar restaurant tabs. What is less
famous is the uniformity of prices for
basic goods and services. A visitor to
Tokyo can spend the better part of an
afternoon wandering through shops
and find beer, lipstick, rice and
hundreds of other items selling for
essentially the same price in every
store. Van Wolferen noted,
Most salary men are urban
consumers, and it is they who,
through relatively high amount of
savings, subsequently channeled
into the keiretsu for capital
investments, have played a crucial
role in sustaining the economic
'miracle'. It is they who in the late
1980s were still subsidizing
Japan's export industries by being
systematically deprived of low-
cost imports and by paying
considerably higher prices than
consumers in the western
industrialized countries for almost
all daily necessities. In most other
countries the rise of the middle
class upset and basically changed
political relations. In Japan such a
disturbing influenced has been
minimized.
This consumer subsidy of export
industries and the interests of
producers can be found in many
sectors of the Japanese economy.
Rice
Throughout the 1980s, the United
States, Thailand and other nations were
protesting against the Japanese ban on
imported rice. The shufuren, or
Federation of Housewives, became
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involved in this interminable struggle.
Most Japanese married women do not
work outside the home, but exercise
nearly absolute control over household
expenditures. 8 Most keep a detailed
log of household receipts and
expenditures, and are judged, at least
by the ever-present mother-in-law, by
how efficient they are in marshaling
assets and pinching pennies. At the
time the shufuren became involved in
the rice dispute, Japanese rice cost
nearly ten times as much as
comparable American or Thai rice.19
Consumers in general and housewives
in particular would normally support
reforms that would allow virtually
identical competing products to be sold
to consumers at a small fraction of the
prevailing and virtually uniform retail
price.
However, the shufuren opposed
opening the Japanese market to foreign
rice, and organized noisy
demonstrations in favor of the ban.
Most of the demonstrators resided in
Tokyo, far from the rice farmers who
would be hurt by the proposed reform.
All of them knew that their precious
household ledgers would benefit from
the competition provided by foreign
rice. Yet they demonstrated against a
reform that would save them money.
They perceived a greater priority than
having the cheapest basket of groceries
this weekend.
Automobiles
When Toyota introduced its Lexus
automobile in the United States in
1991, the Lexus was not sold in Japan
at any price. Even Toyota executives
were forced to sign onto a waiting list
before they could buy a Lexus. When
the auto was finally sold in Japan, the
sticker price was nearly double the
sticker price in the United States
Consumer rebellion never occurred;
many Japanese understood that the
interests of the Japanese consumer had
to be subverted to the export goals of
the Japanese government. The Lexus
automobile was the Japanese
equivalent of the American space
project. Government and industry
cooperated for years to acquire and
perfect the necessary technology, and
to mass produce an automobile as
good or better than any auto
manufactured in the United States. The
enormous sacrifices required continued
after the Lexus was widely available in
the United States. The people who
designed and built the Lexus could not
even buy one in Japan until an export
market had been established.
The Petroleum Industry
Japanese pump prices are the
highest in the world, with a gallon of
gasoline costing nearly $5.00. Japan
imports nearly all of its petroleum, but
other nations do the same and avoid
such high prices. However, other
nations normally have competition in
the form of American, English and
Dutch multinationals, that export and
market refined petroleum products.
Japan is one of the few nations in the
world to blunt this form of
competition.
There is no law or regulation
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banning the import of refined
petroleum into Japan, but it is
impossible to accomplish. Section 12 of
Petroleum Industry Law ("PIL")
required prospective importers to
notify MITI and to file plans.2 ° MITI
was given statutory authority to issue a
kankoku (formal request) to the
importer to change the plans.
However, MITI could effectively ban
the import of petroleum into Japan by
means of gyosei shido (administrative
guidance).
This power is described by Sato Taiji
in Ore Wa Tsusansho ni Barasaeta, ("I
Was Butchered by MITI").2 1 Sato an
entrepreneurial Japanese and president
of Lions Oil, attempted to undercut
retailers and import gasoline into Japan
for distribution to independent
resellers, who could gain market share
at the expense of the established cartel.
Sato initially bought gasoline on the
domestic spot market, while finalizing
plans to import. Frank Upham,
Professor at Boston College Law
School, described the reactions to
Sato's consumer-friendly plans,
Local members of the gas station
trade association organized
convoys of cars to go to his
station. Each bought Y500 (6
dollars) of gas; demanded clean
ashtrays, windshields etc.; and
paid with Y10,000 notes. They cut
his hoses, poured water in his
storage tanks, blocked delivery
tankers and harassed their drivers.
When Sato complained to the
police about the harassment,
including the cutting of hoses and
insertion of water, they replied,
'You're destroying order in the
industry. You're the problem. '22
Sato persisted in his plans to import
gasoline from Singapore Petroleum.
When a tanker carrying imported
gasoline reached Kobe on December
28, 1984, amid much media fanfare, it
appeared that the domestic cartel
would finally be broken. However, the
financing he had arranged was
suddenly canceled on January 4, 1985,
and the tanker left Japan without
unloading gasoline. MITI forced Sato
to abandon his plans to import
gasoline:
MITI also issued a statement in
which it reiterated the threat to
national security posed by Lions'
actions and promised to apply its
kankoku not only to the case before
but also to any future instances of
gasoline importing. As for the
general propriety of unrestricted
imports, MITI noted that the
arrival of foreign goods in Japanese
ports without any prior
consultation would be 'regrettable'
... The kankoku was clear and
unequivocal and, should it be
violated again, resolute and stern
enforcement measures would be
taken. There was, not surprisingly,
no mention of what such measures
would be or on what legal basis
they would be taken.23
MITI was able to stop importation
of gasoline without triggering a
consumer rebellion. It is difficult to
imagine such a scenario in other
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members of the OECD. Cheaper
imports are usually praised as a benefit
to consumers and a stimuli for
domestic producers to become more
efficient to match the foreign
competition. Efforts by an OECD
government to restrict imports would
normally require legal authority, and
some modicum of due process,
whether in the form of an anti-
dumping complaint or customs
regulation. In Japan, MITI and other
government agencies are vested with
broad authority to act for the perceived
national interest. Administrative
guidance is more powerful than many,
if not most, laws.
Interestingly, Japanese consumers
were not always so cooperative. Prior
to World War II, Japan was the site of
substantial consumer unrest. The
infamous "Rice Riots," 24 violent
demonstrations against high
commodity prices, tarnished Japan's
image abroad. Until World War II,
Japan was often regarded as a nation
with rebellious consumers. Losing
World War II, with concomitant
privations, changed the social contract.
Since most Japanese were impecunious
in 1946, there were few vested interests
to overcome in implementing national
policies favoring economic development
even at the expense of personal
sacrifice. Most Japanese believed that
personal sacrifice was essential for
rebuilding Japan. 25
Peer Pressure
Long working hours provide an
additional restraint on consumption.
Workers who spend long hours in a
factory or office, as well as
interminable commutes on packed
trains, often lack the time or inclination
to indulge in excess consumption.
Nakamura Masanobu, managing
Director of the Daiwa Institute of
Research, provided a tongue-in cheek
illustration of this phenomenon,
For a long-term solution to
bilateral trade imbalance, U.S.
pressure should be more social
than economic. I would advise
U.S. Trade Representative Carla
Hills to ask her Japanese
counterpart before a negotiating
session: 'By the way, how many
days did you take off last year?' If
the answer is less than five, she
should say, 'It's no use negotiating
with you. You have no personal
freedom and you don't even
realize it.' Why talk about free
trade with someone like that?
Holidays and trade are related. A
person who is legally entitled to a
vacation but cannot take it
because of custom or peer
pressure will find extralegal ways
to limit U.S. imports.26
Japanese interested in leisure
activities face a host of barriers that
discourage all but the most intrepid.
Expressways are rare and saddled with
high toll charges. Public transport,
although plentiful and run with
precision, tends to be extremely
crowded. Once a person has arrived at
his or her destination, infrastructure in
leisure facilities is woefully inadequate.
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Ski slopes, swimming pools and tennis
courts are packed to capacity and
beyond. Golf Courses are so over-
utilized that many enthusiasts must get
up at 3 A.M. to take advantage of pre-
dawn tee times under klieg lights. The
ever-present high prices discourage
profligate shopping.
Savings Before Consumption
Japan ministries, including but not
limited to MITI, have implemented a
series of policies that discourage
consumption and encourage saving.
Almost every Japanese household took
advantage of a program which enabled
individuals to open a savings account
at the government-sponsored postal
savings banks. Interest on these
accounts was exempt from taxation so
long as the account's balance did not
exceed the equivalent of $10,000. The
plan was so successful that Japanese
opened multiple accounts at different
institutions. By the mid 1980s there
were more of these accounts than there
were people in Japan. During the same
period, the United States taxed interest
income under Section 61 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Japan encouraged
small savers with tax breaks while the
United States discouraged savings by
taxing interest income.
The U.S. Government did not
interfere with the private sector when
it promoted issuance of credit cards to
virtually any U.S. resident, including
those who had declared bankruptcy. In
Japan credit cards were banned by the
Ministry of Finance. When credit cards
were finally allowed, complex
regulations prevented popular
acceptance. In 1998, it is still difficult to
obtain a credit card. Taggart Murphy
notes:
Until the 1980s Japanese
households had effectively no
option for financing major
expenditures except for savings.
Credit cards, installment plan
financing for consumer durables,
and other forms of consumer
credit all were stymied in order to
encourage saving at every point. A
Japanese colleague in the late
1970s told me that when he
resigned from a major Japanese
bank to join Bank of America's
Tokyo office, where we both were
working, his credit card had
promptly been revoked. This was
a married man with plenty of
money and a good job. His
American counterpart would have
had to throw away ten pounds of
junk mail a month offering credit
cards and other inducements to
spend .27
By contrast, U.S. Government policy
encouraged profligate consumption on
credit. Until 1986, heavy use of credit
cards provided a tax benefit since
interest on credit card debt could be
utilized as an itemized deduction on
Schedule A. In Japan, savings were
encouraged while savings were being
discouraged in the United States At the
same time that Japanese consumers
had difficulty getting access to
consumer credit by use of credit cards,
American consumers who acquired
large credit card debt paid lower taxes
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than consumers who stayed out of debt
by limiting their consumption.
Consumption Patterns and Senior
Citizen Policy
Japan and the United States face
fiscal difficulties due to the costs
associated with aging populations, but
their approaches to these impending
crises have been quite different. Efforts
to slash the costs of Medicare by
requiring affluent senior citizens to pay
a greater percentage of Part B costs in
1995 triggered protracted conflict
between President Clinton and House
Speak Newt Gingrich that shut down
the operation of the U.S. Government.
In Japan, a new source of revenue
shouhizei (consumption tax) was
implemented in 1994 with no
noticeable protest on the part of
consumer groups. Nearly all
transactions were subjected to a value
added tax of 3 per cent, which has
since been increased to 5 per cent.
Every consumer in Japan was forced to
shoulder the burden of paying for
future social security costs.
Every nation has budgetary
problems and Japan is no exception to
this rule. However, Japanese budget
decisions are normally made with an
eye towards the future and care of the
young. Income enhancement or spoils
for the seniors are low priorities.
Funding is lavished on schools and
infrastructure for the young. Tax codes
favor stay-at-home mothers and back-
to-work grannies. Senior citizens
discounts are rare. Most prices and tax
rates are equally applied to all age
groups.
Japan has produced a system that
favors the young at the expense of the
old, and has produced a generation of
young Japanese who are better
educated and more productive than
their parents and most of their young
counterparts in the United States. The
sacrifice of Japan's elderly, the result of
deliberate government policies, has
produced spectacular dividends for the
nation. Japan's national wealth and
prestige have risen in tandem with the
soaring literacy and productivity of the
younger generation.
The situation is very different in the
United States. The United States,
goaded by powerful pressure groups
such as the American Association of
Retired Person ("AARP"), has
produced a system that favors the old
at the expense of the young. "Retired"
individuals, many of whom continue
to work and accumulate capital, are
given discounts on virtually every
good and service traded in the United
States. State, local and federal tax
regimes are rigged to assure that
seniors pay far less than the young.
Americans over the age of 65 are
exempt from the punishing 15% Social
Security withholding. Ninety per cent
of American workers under the age of
thirty pay more in Social Security than
in federal tax, and know they will
never get this money back. One recent
poll found that more X Generation
respondents believed in UFOs than
believed in receiving any payback from
Social Security.
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Today's seniors routinely take out
ten to fifteen times as much in Social
Security and Medicare benefits than
they paid into the system, adjusted for
inflation. More than two million
immigrant seniors receive free Part A
Medicare benefits without ever having
paid into the system. Meanwhile, fifty
percent of Americans between twenty-
one and twenty-five years old were
without health insurance at some point
in 1995, although most dutifully paid
for Medicare benefits for the elderly.
While American seniors are
enjoying an unprecedented era of
prosperity and consumption, fueled by
a web of tax breaks, subsidies and
discounts, Japan's seniors continue to
pay the same high prices other
consumers must pay for goods and
services. Many continue to work long
hours and take less out of the economy
than they put in. Even though their
generation has essentially "won" the
struggle to rebuild Japan, Japan's
seniors are a remarkably quiescent lot,
and ask for very little in the way of
material rewards.
Antitrust in Japan
The ultimate weapon in favor of the
consumer in the United States is the
very real threat of the U.S. government
suing large companies, such as IBM
and Microsoft, if they become too
powerful in the marketplace. Japan
also has antitrust laws and an
enforcement agency, the Japan Fair
Trade Commission, ("JFTC").
However, Japanese antitrust laws and
the JFIC are radically different from
their counterparts in the U.S.
Japan never enacted its own
antitrust laws until it was forced to by
the Occupation. This legislation28 was
enacted at the behest of the Supreme
Command of the Allied Forces ("SCAP")
to break up the zaibatsu (money gangs),
that had been instrumental in Japan's
war effort. Huge combines such as
Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Fuji, operated a
central, bank, steel company,
housewares company, and so on, under
central ownership and control. Each
zaibatsu resembled a parallel economy,
but competed against other zaibatsu in
Japan's domestic economy. Throughout
the 1930s, the Ministry of Munitions
had encouraged the development of
each group in preparation for Japan's
war effort in Asia and beyond.
After the war, SCAP reasoned that
the concentration of economic power
in a few hands was anathema to its
goals. The SCAP officials probably did
not have the interests of Japanese
consumers at heart, but they drafted
and forced Japan to pass 29 legislation
modeled after the Sherman Antitrust
Act 3 0 in the U.S. The watchdog JFTC
was patterned after the Fair Trade
Commission ("FTC") in the U.S.
Japan obediently enacted the
Antimonopoly Laws, but did little to
enforce them. In fact, the JFTC
appeared to pursue policies that
contravened the competitive intent
underlying antitrust laws. The JFTC
did nothing as MITI reorganized the
zaibatsu into keiretsu (related line)
groups of companies. With the keiretsu,
no holding company owned a majority
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of the voting shares of all the
companies in the group. However,
cross-shareholdings between member
companies, often coordinated by a
single large bank, accomplished many
of the same objectives of the original
zaibatsu. The new organizations were
termed shinkon zaibatsu (newly-married
money gangs). The free-trade SCAP
officials were placated, and MITI
maintained much of the authority over
the Japanese economy it had enjoyed
prior to World War II.
Professor Mark Tilton of Purdue
University noted,
The Japanese Antimonopoly
system differs from the U.S.
system in that all antimonopoly
law is embedded in one law.
While enforcement in the U.S. is
shared by the antitrust division of
the Justice Department and the
Federal Trade Commission, in
Japan it is concentrated in an
independent FTC. This
independence and complete
authority might have made the
FTC very powerful; but once
SCAP's production was lost at the
end of the occupation, the
centralization of authority made it
easy for opponents of the law to
limit enforcement by simply
controlling a single institution. In
addition, it is still very difficult for
a private party to bring an
antitrust suit .... Therefore the
FTC always acts as both judge and
prosecutor. According to Fujiwara
Ichiro, a former MITI official, this
dual role presents a problem
because the Japanese are
uncomfortable with the
litigiousness of the
Antimonopoly Law. The FTC
therefore avoids spending
excessive time and expense on
cases in favor or discussion and
compromise. Nevertheless,
such a cultural argument is
unnecessary for explaining the
FTC's weakness. Its lack of
political support is due to the
historical association of cartels
with development and
considerable obstacles to
bringing suit within the legal
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The JFTC has proven to be a
silent watchdog when it comes to
enforcing consumer rights. The JFTC
has brought very few price-fixing
cases and has imposed token fines in
the cases that involved penalties.
Since private citizens cannot bring
antitrust suits in Japan and the JFTC
has done so little to enforce
consumer rights, this avenue for
consumer protection has largely
been closed.32
Propsects for the Future
Japan ended a remarkable period
of economic growth in or about
January, 1990, when the Tokyo Stock
Exchange retreated from record
highs, and the Japanese financial
system became severely burdened
by nonperforming loans extended
during the "bubble economy" of the
1980s. By 1998, the financial
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retrenchment had taken its toll with the
bankruptcy of Yamaichi Securities Co.
and many smaller firms. This period of
retrenchment spawned some
speculation that Japan's days of
success through state-guided
capitalism were over.33 Many reasoned
that the Japanese system that had
proven so successful in restraining
consumer demand and channeling
capital and resources into export
industries would have to reform in
order to extricate itself from financial
ruin. Much of this commentary was
excessively pessimistic. Foreign
observers essentially discounted the
viability of the Japanese system during
the oil crisis of 1973, the second oil
shock of the early 1980s, the endaka
(High yen) period from 1988 to 1994,
and again during the financial
upheavals of 1997 and 1998. Such
pessimistic prognostications proved
false in the past and may well prove to
be false in the year 2000 and beyond.
During the supposed collapse in the
Japanese economy between 1992 to
1998, Japanese companies increased
world market share in a host of key
industries, including shipbuilding and
automobiles4
Although Japanese citizens and
companies sustained financial
hardships after the collapse of the
bubble economy, there has been no
significant change in the organization
of the Japanese economy that would
increase the power of consumers or
consumer groups in formulating
policy. Power continues to reside in the
bureaucrats, who have shown scant
inclination to serve the interests of
consumers. Japan's domestic prices
continue to be extremely high.
Incentives for consumers to save and
disincentives to consume remain in
place. Change is likely to come slowly,
if it comes about at all.
Conclusion
The spirit of national sacrifice
embraced by followers of Dazai
Osamu may seem anachronistic in
1998, to foreign observers as well as
the Japanese themselves. However,
many of the bureaucrats still believe in
the old time religion, and show no
inclination in relinquishing the power
they have to regulate the Japanese
economy and consumer behavior. For
their part, Japanese consumers have
continued to be a remarkably
quiescent lot, remaining silent during
the imposition of the consumption tax,
and continuing to pay excessive prices
for most basic goods and services. The
long-forecast consumer rebellion that
will discard the doctrine of self-
sacrifice in favor of greater consumer
rights has still not materialized. Until it
does, Japanese consumers seem
grudgingly content to ask for very
little and allow the bureaucrats to man
the helm.
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